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Dugundji’s Theorem Revisited
Marcelo E. Coniglio, Newton M. Peron
Abstract. In 1940 Dugundji proved that no system between S1 and S5
can be characterized by finite matrices. Dugundji’s result forced the devel-
opment of alternative semantics, in particular Kripke’s relational seman-
tics. The success of this semantics allowed the creation of a huge family
of modal systems. With few adaptations, this semantics can characterize
almost the totality of the modal systems developed in the last five decades.
This semantics however has some limits. Two results of incompleteness
(for the systems KH and VB) showed that not every modal logic can
be characterized by Kripke frames. Besides, the creation of non-classical
modal logics puts the problem of characterization of finite matrices very
far away from the original scope of Dugundji’s result. In this sense, we will
show how to update Dugundji’s result in order to make precise the scope
and the limits of many-valued matrices as semantic of modal systems. A
brief comparison with the useful Chagrov and Zakharyaschev’s criterion
of tabularity for modal logics is provided.
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010). Primary 03B45;
Secondary 03B50.
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1. Introduction
The birth of symbolic modal logic seems to have a date: in general it is pos-
tulated1 that Lewis inaugurated in 1912 this large family of logics. Aiming to
create a new implication, the strict implication, the author proposes in 1918
the system S3.
Shortly thereafter, in 1920, Lukasiewicz presents a set of matrices for
a 3-valued logic L3 in order to modelize the new modal concept of possibly
true.2 In 1932, Lewis proposes the hierarchy S1–S5. Thus, a question arises: is
it possible that finite logical matrices can characterize the systems S1–S5?
This question was resolved by Dugundji eight years later: it was shown
that not only Lukasiewicz’s matrices, but no finite matrix can be a complete
semantics for any system between S1 and S5.
1 According to [1].
2 See [16].
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It is worth noting that the system S5 has the particular property of being
a limit to the many-valued modal semantics. As shown by Scroogs in his 1951’s
article [20], every regular extension of S5 (that is, every set of formulas in the
language of S5 extending its theorems and closed under substitutions, modus
ponens and the necessitation rule) can be characterized by finite matrices.
Besides, these extensions can be axiomatized by adding to S5 instances of the
formula used by Dugundji in order to prove his incompleteness result.
A natural question is to find another modal system with the feature of
being a limit in the above sense. This problem was solved in 1977 by Esakia
and Meskhi (see [8]), showing that there exist exactly four regular extensions of
S4 different to S5—the systems K1.2, K2.2, K3.1 and K3.23—having the same
property of S5, namely: every regular extension of them can be characterized
by finite matrices.
Observe that the four systems above are outside the Lewis hierarchy and
so they are outside the scope of Dugundji’s theorem. There is also a large
list of important modal systems based on Propositional Classical Logic PC
that are also outside the scope of Dugundji’s result. Among them it is worth
mentioning: K, D, T, B, GL, VB, KH, and S0.5.
It is not clear, on the other hand, that Dugundji’s argument holds for
modal logics whose non-modal propositional fragment is not classical (such as
implicative, positive, paraconsistent or paracomplete modal logics).
Perhaps one of the most interesting among all these fragments was pro-
posed by Henkin4 in 1949. Henkin’s system has only the implication ⊃ as oper-
ator, which preserves convenient properties such as the Deduction Metatheo-
rem. We will see that a big family of modal systems whose non-modal proposi-
tional substratum is between Henkin’s Implicative Calculus and Propositional
Classical Logic cannot be characterized by finite matrices.
What we demonstrate here5 is that the original result of Dugundji can be
extended in two different senses: by embracing many modal systems developed
from the forties until today, on the one hand, and by considering some modal
logics whose non-modal fragment is not classical, on the other.
2. The Lewis’ Systems S1–S5
The system S1, the first one of the five systems of the Lewis’ hierarchy, is
defined as an extension of Propositional Classical Logic PC (presented in the
propositional language just containing ¬, ∧), by adding an unary operator ♦.
3 The systems K1.1, K2.2 and K3.1 were proposed by Sobociński in [21], while K3.2 was
formulated by Zeman in [22, pp. 253].
4 In [12].
5 Although it was considered the original Dugundji’s article [7], we preferred to follow the
clearer proof of it given in [4].
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By defining the strict implication  as α  β = ¬♦(α ∧ ¬β), the system S1
adds to PC the following:6
Axioms
(B1) (p ∧ q)  (q ∧ p)
(B2) (p ∧ q)  p
(B3) p  (p ∧ p)
(B4) (p ∧ (q ∧ r))  ((p ∧ q) ∧ r)
(B6) ((p  q) ∧ (q  r))  (p  r)
(B7) (p ∧ (p  q))  q
Inference Rules
Uniform A valid formula remains valid if a formula
Substitution is uniformly substituted in it for a
propositional variable
Substitution of Two strictly equivalent formulas are
Strict Equivalents intersubstitutable, where α and β are strictly
equivalent if α  β and β  α are both valid
Adjunction α ∧ β follows from α and β
Strict Inference β follows from α and α  β
It can be proven that  enjoys some useful properties of an implication con-
nective. For instance, p  p is a theorem of S1 (notation: S1 p  p):
1. p  (p ∧ p) [(B3)]
2. (p ∧ p)  p [ Uniform Substitution in (B2)]
3. (p  (p ∧ p)) ∧ ((p ∧ p)  p) [ Adjunction in 1 and 2]
4. ((p  (p ∧ p)) ∧ ((p ∧ p)  p))  (p  p)[ Uniform Substitution in (B6)]
5. p  p [Strict Inference in 3 and 4]
Now, consider the following list of axioms:
(B8) ♦(p ∧ q)  ♦p
(A8) (p  q)  (¬♦q  ¬♦p)
(C10) ¬♦¬p  ¬♦¬¬♦¬p
(C11) ♦p  ¬♦¬♦p
Then the Lewis hierarchy is defined as follows:
– S2 = S1 ∪ {(B8)}
– S3 = S1 ∪ {(A8)}
– S4 = S1 ∪ {(C10)}
6 The axioms and rules below can be found in [13] and [1]. We exclude axiom (B5) p  ¬¬p,
since McKinsey proves in [18] that it can be deduced from the others.
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– S5 = S3 ∪ {(C11)}
Lewis shown that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ S3 ⊂ S4 ⊂ S5, by means of the following strat-
egy: he introduces four-valued truth-tables for the connectives of these logics
with some designated truth-values, which satisfy all the axioms of S1, unless
(B8), such that the inferences rules take designated values into designated
ones; thus, S1 ⊂ S2. The same method is used to prove the other (strict)
inclusions.
Up to now, we just introduce axioms and rules for ♦ and . Gödel intro-
duced, for the first time, the operator  defined as ¬♦¬, with the aim of
showing that the intuitionistic propositional calculus IPC can be interpreted
in S4. In order to do this, he proposed the following version of S4:7
(K) (p → q) → (p → q)
(T) p → p
(4) p → p
Necessitation Rule If α is a theorem then α is also a theorem.
In order to obtain S5 it is sufficient to add to S4 the following:
(5) ♦p → ♦p
3. Dugundji’s Theorem
In a short paper (having just two pages) Dugundji showed that no finite matrix
can characterize any modal logic between S1 and S5.
The procedure is simple: by defining a family of formulas Σn of the modal
language (for n ≥ 1), it is shown that any matrix with n truth-values which
models S1 (or any extension of it) also validates Σn. On the other hand, it
is shown that there exist an infinite matrix which models S5 but it does not
validate any Σn. But then, if any system between S1 and S5 could be charac-
terized by a finite matrix with, say, n elements, then Σn would be a theorem of
that system (because of the first result and by completeness) and so Σn would
be a theorem of S5, contradicting the second result.
In order to formalize the argument above, it is necessary to recall some
notions about matrix semantics.
Definition 3.1. Let L be a propositional language. A matrix M over L is a
triple M = 〈M,D,O〉 in which:
(i) M = ∅ is a set of truth-values
(ii) D ⊆ M is a set of designated truth-values
(iii) O is a set of operations over M interpreting the connectives of L.

Definition 3.2. A matrix M characterizes a propositional logical system L if
O contains an operation for each connective of the language of L, of the same
arity, such that all theorems of L and only them receive designated values when
7 This axiomatization, as well as the translation of IPC into S4, can be found in [9] and [11].
Vol. 8 (2014) Dugundji’s Theorem Revisited 411
L is interpreted in M.8 A matrix M is a model of a logical system L if all
theorems of L (but not necessarily only them) receive designated values when
L in interpreted in M 
It is worth noting that the formulas proposed by Dugundji are adapted
from the formulas used by Gödel in order to prove the incompleteness of Intu-
itionistic Propositional Calculus (IPC) by finite matrices, by substituting the
material bi-implication by the strict bi-implication.9 Dugundji’s strategy will
be followed here, by proposing the formulas below:
Definition 3.3. For each natural number n, the adapted Dugundji’s formula





in which 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n + 1 and pi  pj means (pi ⊃ pi) ⊃ (pj ⊃ pi). 
Proposition 3.4. Any finite matrix with n truth-values which is a model of an
extension of S1 validates the formula Dn.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a matrix M with n truth-values which models
an extension of S1. Let v be a valuation over M. Since there are only n values
for n + 1 variables, there exists i and j such that the values assigned by v
to pi and pj will coincide, and so the values assigned by v to (pi  pj) and
(pi  pi) will also coincide. On the other hand S1 p → p and so, by PC, (K)
and Necessitation Rule, it follows that (pi  pi) is a theorem of S1. By PC, it
follows that (pi  pi) ∨ α and α ∨ (pi  pi) are also theorems of S1, for every
α. Therefore the valuation v satisfies α ∨ (pi  pi) ∨ β for every α and β, and
so it satisfies Dn. Thus, M validates Dugundji’s adapted formula Dn. 
The second part of Dugundji’s argument shows that there exists an infi-
nite matrix which models S5 but it does not validate any formula Dn of
Dugundji.
Definition 3.5. Let M∞ be the infinite matrix such that
– M = ℘(N), that is, the powerset of the set N of natural numbers;
– D = {N};
– O = {∪,∩, (·),,},
where ∪,∩ and (·) denote the usual set-theoretic operations of union, intersec-
tion and complement, respectively, and where  and  are defined as follows:
X =
{




N if X = ∅
∅ otherwise .
8 Technically, such interpretations are given by means of homomorphisms (valuations) from
the algebra of formulas of L into the algebra 〈M, O〉.
9 The original proof of Gödel’s result can be found in [10] and [11].
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Proposition 3.6. The infinite matrix M∞ models S5, but does not validate any
formula Dn.
Proof. We will prove that every axiom of S5 is valid in the matrix M∞, and
that every valuation over M∞ which satisfies the premises of an inference rule
of S5 also satisfies the conclusion of that rule. Let v : V ar −→ M be a valuation
over M∞. Thus, v is a function which assigns an element of ℘(N) to any
propositional variable of the language of S5 and, for every formulas α and β:
– v(¬α) = v(α);
– v(α → β) = v(α) ∪ v(β);
– v(α) = (v(α));
– v(♦α) = (v(α)).
With respect to the axioms of classical logic and the rule of Modus Ponens,
they are satisfied by v because of the algebraic completeness of classical logic
with respect to Boolean algebras. Concerning the modal axioms:
(K) v((α → β) → (α → β)) = (v(α) ∪ v(β)) ∪ v(α) ∪ v(β)
– if v(α) = N, then v(α) = N
– if v(α) = N, then
* if v(β) = N, then v(β) = N
* if v(β) = N, then v(α) ∪ v(β) = N and (v(α) ∪ v(β)) = N
(T) v(α → α) = v(α) ∪ v(α)
– if v(α) = N, then v(α) ∪ v(α) = N
– if v(α) = N, then v(α) = N
(4) v(α → α) = v(α) ∪ v(α)
* if v(α) = N, then v(α) = N and v(α) = N
* if v(α) = N, then v(α) = ∅ and v(α) = N
(5) v(♦α → ♦α) = v(α) ∪ v(α)
– if v(α) = ∅, then v(α) = ∅ and v(α) = N
– if v(α) = ∅, then v(α) = N and v(α) = N
Concerning the Necessitation Rule, observe that if v(α) = N then v(α) = N.
From this, it follows (by induction on the length of derivations) that M∞
validates any theorem of S5 and so it is a model of S5.
Finally, observe that every formula Dn can be falsified in M∞. In fact,
consider the valuation v over M∞ which assigns to each propositional variable
pi the singleton Xi = {i} ∈ ℘(N). Note that, if i = j, then Xi ∪ Xj = N and
Xj ∪ Xi = N. Thus:
v(pi  pj) = (Xi ∪ Xi) ∩ (Xj ∪ Xi) = ∅ ∩ ∅ = ∅.
Therefore, Dugundji’s formula Dn takes the non-designated value ∅ under the
valuation v in the matrix M∞. 
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Theorem 3.7. (Dugundji’s Theorem). No modal system L between S1 and S5
can be characterized by a finite matrix.
Proof. Suppose that some system L between S1 and S5 can be characterized
by a matrix with n elements. Then, by Proposition 3.4, the formula Dn would
be validated by such matrix and so Dn would be a theorem of L. Then, Dn
would be a theorem of S5 and so M∞ would validate Dn, which is an absurd,
by Proposition 3.6. 
4. Other Modal Systems
Consider the following axiom schemas and rules of inference, where α, β and
γ are (meta)variables ranging over formulas:
(A1) α ⊃ (β ⊃ α)
(A2) (α ⊃ β) ⊃ ((α ⊃ (β ⊃ γ)) ⊃ (α ⊃ γ))
(A3) (α ⊃ γ) ⊃ (((α ⊃ β) ⊃ γ) ⊃ γ)
(GL) (α ⊃ α) ⊃ α
(MP) from α and α ⊃ β infer β
(N) if  α then  α
(N’) if  α and α is a PC⊃-tautology, then  α
(N*) if  α ⊃ β then  α ⊃ β
Definition 4.1.
(i) PC⊃ = {(A1), (A2), (A3),(MP)}10
(ii) S0.50,⊃= PC⊃ ∪ {(K),(N’)}
(iii) C2⊃ = PC⊃ ∪ {(K),(N*)}11
(iv) K⊃= PC⊃ ∪ {(K),(N)}
(v) GL= K ∪ {(4),(GL)}
Since we are considering weaker versions of S5 whose non-modal fragment does
not have a classical negation, it will be convenient to consider the following
definition of disjunction in PC⊃ in terms of the material implication:
α ∨ β =def (α ⊃ β) ⊃ β.
Theorem 4.2.
(i) PC⊃ α ⊃ α
(ii) PC⊃ α ⊃ (α ∨ β)
(iii) PC⊃ α ⊃ (β ∨ α)
(iv) PC⊃ (α ∨ (β ∨ γ)) ⊃ ((α ∨ β) ∨ γ)
(v) PC⊃ ((α ∨ β) ∨ γ) ⊃ (α ∨ (β ∨ γ))
Proof. See [3, p. 27–28].12 
10 This constitutes the original axiomatization of Henkin’s system PC⊃ in [12].
11 The systems S0.5 and C2 were considered by Lemmon in [15] and [14] as being modally
minimal. S0.50 is obtained by removing the axiom (T) from S0.5, check [6, p. 207]. As the
reader may have noticed, the notation ⊃ means that the non-modal propositional base is
PC⊃.
12 The defined disjunction satisfies additional interesting properties; however, the above
features are enough for our purposes.
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We will prove that any modal logic between S0.50 and S5 or between C2
and S5 whose non-modal fragment is between PC⊃ and PC can not be char-
acterized by finite matrices. Then, we will show an analogs result for systems
between K and GL.
5. Enlarging the Scope of Dugundji’s Theorem
In this section, three results will be obtained (Theorems 5.3, 5.4, 5.8) which
enlarge the original scope of Dugundji’s Theorem.
Proposition 5.1. Any finite matrix with n truth-values that is a model of an
extension of S0.50,⊃ validates Dn.
Proof. Analogous to that for Proposition 3.4, replacing (N) by (N’) and PC
by PC⊃. 
Proposition 5.2. Any finite matrix with n truth-values that is a model of an
extension of C2⊃ validates Dn.
Proof. Analogous to that for Proposition 3.4, replacing (N) by (N*) and PC
by PC⊃. 
Theorem 5.3. No modal system L between S0.50 and S5 whose non-modal frag-
ment is between PC⊃ and PC can be characterized by finite matrices.
Proof. Based on Proposition 3.6, the proof is analogous to that for Theo-
rem 3.7, but now using Proposition 5.1 instead of Proposition 3.4. 
Theorem 5.4. No modal system L between C2 and S5 whose non-modal frag-
ment is between PC⊃ and PC can be characterized by a finite matrix.
Proof. The proof is similar to the previous one, but now using Proposition 5.2.

From Theorems 5.3 and 5.4, the scope of the new versions of Dugundji’s
Theorem includes now the systems displayed in the Fig .1.13
13Fig. 1, L1 −→ L2 means that L1 is an proper extension of L2. See [20].
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Proposition 5.5. Any finite matrix of n truth-values that is a model of K⊃
validates also the formula Dn.
Proof. The argument is analogous to that of Proposition 3.4. 
Definition 5.6. Let M′∞ be the infinite matrix such that
• M = ℘(N)
• D = {N}
• O = {∪,∩, (·),}, in which ∪,∩ and (·) denote the usual set-theoretic
operations of union, intersection and complement, respectively, while the
operator  is defined as follows:14
X =
{
N if X is cofinite
N − {0} otherwise
.
Consider valuations over M′∞ as mappings v which assign an element of ℘(N)
to each formula of GL in the following way:
• v(¬α) = v(α);
• v(α → β) = v(α) ∪ v(β);
• v(α) = (v(α)).
Proposition 5.7. The infinite matrix M′∞ is a model of GL.
Proof. Let us see that every modal axiom is valid in M′∞:
(K) v(K) = (v(α) ∪ v(β)) ∪ v(α) ∪ v(β)
– if v(β) is cofinite, then v(β) = N and so v(K) = N.
– if v(β) is not cofinite, then v(β) = N − {0}.
* if v(α) is not cofinite, then v(α) = N − {0}. Then v(α) = {0}
and v(α) ∪ v(β) = N. Therefore v(K) = N.
* if v(α) is cofinite, then v(α) is finite. Thus, v(α) ∪ v(β) is not
cofinite. Then, (v(α)∪v(β)) = N−{0} and so (v(α) ∪ v(β)) =
{0}. Therefore v(K) = N.
(4) v(4) = v(α) ∪   v(α)
– if v(α) is cofinite, then v(α) = N. Since N is cofinite, it follows that
  v(α) = N and so v(4) = N.
– if v(α) is not cofinite, then v(α) = N−{0}. Since N−{0} is cofinite,
then   v(α) = N and so v(4) = N.
14 The function that calculates  was inspired in [19], as an example of a modal operator
of diagonalizable algebras.
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(GL) v(GL) = (v(α) ∪ v(α)) ∪ v(α)
– if v(α) is cofinite, then v(α) = N and v(GL) = N.
– if v(α) is not cofinite, then v(α) = N − {0}. Thus v(α) = {0} and
so v(α)∪v(α) is not cofinite. Then, (v(α)∪v(α)) = N−{0} and
(v(α) ∪ v(α)) = {0}. Therefore v(GL) = {0} ∪ (N − {0}) = N.
Finally, if v(α) = N, then v(α) is cofinite and v(α) = N. So, M′∞
preserves (N) and all the GL axioms. 
Theorem 5.8. No system L between K and GL whose non-modal fragment is
between PC⊃ and PC can be characterized by finite matrices.
Proof. Given n ≥ 1, consider the Dugundji’s formula Dn and the matrix M′∞
of Proposition 5.7. Let v be the valuation over M′∞ which associates to each
propositional variable pi (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1) the set
Xi = {x : x = (n + 1) · k + (i − 1) for some k ∈ N}.
Let 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n + 1 such that i = j. Then, Xj ∩ Xi = ∅ and so Xj ∪ Xi = Xj
such that Xj is not cofinite. From this,
(Xi ∪ Xi) ∪ (Xj ∪ Xi) = N ∪ Xj = ∅ ∪ (N − {0}) = N − {0}
and then v assigns to Dn the non-designated value N − {0}.
Suppose now that there is an n-valued matrix M′n which characterizes a
system L between K and GL. Then, by Proposition 5.5, the formula Dn would
be a theorem of L and so a theorem of GL. But then, by Proposition 5.7,
Dn would receive the designated value N through the valuation v in M′∞, a
contradiction. 
The Fig. 2 displays some well-known modal systems that lies within the
scope of Theorem 5.8, another new version of Dugundji’s Theorem.
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6. Chagrov and Zakharyaschev’s Criterion of Tabularity
The question of finding a finite matrix semantics for a logic (modal or not) is
related to decidability of that logic. Indeed, a logic characterized by a finite
matrix is decidable, and this is why Dugundji-like theorems are so relevant. A
particular case of decidability of a modal system L is obtained by the so-called
tabularity property:
Definition 6.1. A modal system is tabular if it can be characterized by a finite
Kripke frame. That is, there exists a Kripke frame F = 〈W,R〉 where W is
finite such that, for every formula α of the language of L: 〈F , V 〉, w  α for
every valuation V over F and every w ∈ W (or for every distinguished w, if L
is not normal), iff L α.
It should be observed that tabularity is a particular case of character-
izability by a finite matrix. Indeed, if a modal system L is characterized
by a finite frame F = 〈W,R〉 then it is characterized by a finite matrix
MF = 〈℘(W ),D,O〉 such that D = {Z}, where Z is W , if L is normal, and Z is
the set of distinguished worlds, otherwise. The interpretation O of the connec-
tives is defined as expected, namely O(∧)(X,Y ) = X∩Y , O(∨)(X,Y ) = X∪Y ,
O(⊃)(X,Y ) = (W − X)∪Y , O(¬)(X) = W − X, and
O()(X) =def {w ∈ W : R[w] ⊆ X}
O(♦)(X) =def {w ∈ W : R[w] ∩ X = ∅}
for every X,Y ∈ ℘(W ), where R[w] = {w′ ∈ W : wRw′}. Thus, a tabular
modal logic is a modal logic characterizable by a finite matrix having a single
designated truth-value.
In [5] a criterion of tabularity was obtained. In fact, they show that a
modal logic which extends K can be characterized by a finite Kripke frame iff
certain formulas are derivable [see [5], Theorem 12.1 (i)]. More precisely:
Theorem 6.2. Fix n ≥ 1. Let p1, . . . , pn be the first n propositional variables
in V ar, and let ϕi be the formula p1 ∧ p2 ∧ . . . ∧ pi−1 ∧ ¬pi ∧ pi+1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Consider the formulas αn and βn defined as follows:




¬♦m(♦ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ♦ϕn).
Then, an extension L of K is tabular iff L (αn ∧ βn) for some n ≥ 1.
Being so, an extension L of K is tabular iff there is some n ≥ 1 such that
the canonical model of L has the following properties:
1. if w1Rw2R . . . Rwk (for k distinct worlds) then k < n (w1 must be dis-
tinguished, if L is not normal);
2. in every chain as above, wk is of branching ≤ n − 1, that is: if wkRw′1,
. . . , wkRw′m (for m distinct worlds) then m < n.
It is worth noting that Theorem 5.8 is related to Theorem 6.2, in the
following sense: if L is an extension of K contained in GL, since it can be
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proved that the canonical model of GL refutes αn or βn for every n ≥ 1,
then L is not tabular, by Theorem 6.2. Moreover, in (a restricted version of)
Theorem 5.8 the system GL could be changed to GL.3, the system obtained
from GL by adding the linearity axiom
(L) (p ⊃ q) ∨ (+q ⊃ p) where +α denotes (α ∧ α). This is
an easy consequence of Theorem 6.2 and the fact that GL.3 is characterized by
the frame 〈N, >〉. Analogously, GL could be changed to Grz.3 in (a restricted
version of) Theorem 5.8, recalling that Grz.3 is obtained from K by adding
axioms
(grz) ((p ⊃ p) ⊃ p) ⊃ p
(sc) (p ⊃ q) ∨ (q ⊃ p)
Since Grz.3 is characterized by the frame 〈N,≥〉, the result follows again by
Theorem 6.2.
However, Theorem 5.8 is not a particular case of Theorem 6.2, by two
reasons. Firstly, the former shows (when restricted to modal logics based on
PC) that some class of modal logics cannot be characterized by finite matrices,
while the latter guarantees that the same class of logics cannot be characterized
by finite matrices with just one designated truth-value. Moreover, Theorem 5.8
also applies to modal logics whose non-modal fragment is between PC⊃ and
PC. In contrast, Theorem 6.2 only applies to modal logics based on PC.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we show that the scope of Dugundji’s Theorem can be enlarged
not only to modal systems S1–S5, but to a large class of well-known normal and
non-normal modal systems whose non-modal fragment lies between Henkin’s
implicative calculus and Propositional Classical Logic.
However, this list is not exhaustive. Among the non-normal modal sys-
tems, certain extensions of S5 such as S6, S7, S8 and S9 were not considered.
With respect to normal modal systems, we can mention the K-systems pro-
posed by Sobociński, such as K1, K1.1, K1.2, K2, K2.1, K2.2, K3.1 and K4.
Concerning the latter, it is worth mentioning that, as a consequence of Esakia
and Meskhi’s result, we know that K4 can be characterized by finite matrices.
An open question is to determine its characteristic matrices. Another question
is to determine if there exist some other modal systems (normal or not) differ-
ent from K1.2, K2.2, K3.1, K3.2 and S5 such that all of their extensions can
be characterized by finite matrices.
Matrix semantics is not just an alternative to Kripke semantics for modal
logics. Besides being extremely intuitive, a suitable matrix semantics could
reduce the algorithmic complexity with respect to the relational semantics,
increasing the potential applications of modal logic to Computer Science.
We do not present here a matrix semantics alternative to the usual Kripke
models. Our results are, in a sense, negative. However, they intend to make
a contribution to the question of determine the class of systems which can
be characterizable by a finite matrix semantics, besides the extremely useful
Chagrov and Zakharyaschev’s criterion of tabularity discussed in Sect. 6.
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It is worth noting that both Gödel’s incompleteness theorem for intu-
itionistic logic and Dugundji’s Theorem (and its generalizations) use the fact
that there are infinite propositional variables in the language. The argument,
however, is no longer valid in a language with a finite number of variables. It
suggests that a modal logic defined in a language with finite variables could
be characterized by finite matrices, and so this kind of modal logics would be
interesting from the point of view of applications.
We hope that all the questions mentioned here can contribute to the
current resumption of matrix semantics for modal logic, that was marginalized
after the incredible success of Kripke semantics, as observed in [2].
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Chapecó, SC, Brazil
e-mail: newton.peron@uffs.edu.br
Received: June 2, 2013.
Accepted: February 25, 2014.
